The Scottish Revolution in its International Context, 1639-1640 by Packard, Leanna
The Scottish Revolution in its International Context,
1639-1640
A Senior Honors Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for graduation with research
distinction in History in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University
by
Leanna Packard
The Ohio State University
February 2009
Project Advisor: Professor Geoffrey Parker, Department of History
ii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments 1
Conventions and Abbreviations 2
Preface 3
I.  International Dynamics & the Road to Revolution 5
2. A Treasonous Superscription 30
3. The Rebellion Progresses 43
Conclusion 62
Appendix A 64
Appendix B 66
Bibliography 67
1Acknowledgements
I am greatly indebted to the constant support and encouragement of Professor Geoffrey
Parker.  Without his guidance and patience this thesis would not have been possible.  I
am also grateful to the History Department at Ohio State University, specifically
Professor David Cressy, Professor Greg Anderson, and Professor Jennifer Siegel, who all
provided me with unfailing support and direction.
2Conventions and Abbreviations
Conventions
Dates throughout utilize the Julian Calendar used in Scotland, Ireland, and England
during the seventeenth century.  However each year throughout begins on 1 January, as in
Scotland, but not in England and Ireland, where the year began on 25 March. The
majority of continental Europe utilized the Gregorian Calendar, which was ten days
different from the Julian Calendar: thus 5 September 1639 in Great Britain was 15
September in France and the Low Countries.
Abbreviations
NA – National Archives, London
NAS – National Archives Scotland, Edinburgh
3Preface
The Scottish Revolution of 1637-40 has been extensively researched and
documented, either by itself or in conjunction with the Irish Rebellion and English Civil
War that soon followed.  Then in a series of path-breaking studies Steve Murdoch
revealed the Revolution’s international context, particularly Scotland’s relationship with
Scandinavia and the Dutch.  The Scots received support from the United Provinces,
because they too had rebelled against their sovereign when he attempted to force an alien
confession of faith upon them.1  Sweden also gave support to the Scots as “…Sweden too
owed her independence to an uprising against the tyrannical rule of a foreign power,
Denmark…”2  The Scottish connection with France during the Revolution has, by
contrast, been neglected.
This is surprising, because Scotland and France had been traditional allies since
the thirteenth century, something the Scots called the Auld Alliance, yet historians have
overlooked their connection during the Revolution.  Charles I, ruler of England, Scotland,
and Ireland since 1625, did not make this mistake.  Although he made only muted
protests when the Covenanters received aid from Scandinavia and the Dutch, when the
Scots reached out to Louis XIII and France for assistance Charles created an international
incident.  The possibility of French involvement in Scotland terrified the king.  Thus he
chose to take a stand when his agents intercepted a letter, written by the Covenanters to
                                                 
1 Steve Murdoch, “Scotland, Scandinavia and the bishops’ wars, 1638-40,” in The Stuart
Kingdoms in the Seventeenth Century, eds. Allan I. Macinnes and Jane Ohlmeyer,
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002), 115.
2 Ibid, 115.
4Louis XIII, and he used it to mobilize English support in what would become known as
the Short Parliament in hopes of attaining funding for his second war against the Scots.
For the Scots, the letter to France was the last best hope of securing serious
foreign aid against a king who seemed bent on destroying their religious and political
liberty.  Although the interception of the letter made French intervention impossible, the
appeal of the Scottish leaders does provide important information on the international
dynamic between Scotland, England, and their continental neighbors during the Scottish
Revolution from 1639 to 1640.
5Chapter 1
International Dynamics & the Road to Revolution
Charles I succeeded his father James I and VI in 1625, making him the first adult
heir to ascend the Scottish throne since 1390.3  He also took over the throne at a time of
relative peace in Scotland, especially after considering the country’s tumultuous
experiences in the 16th century.  Yet the 17th century presented Scotland with another
reality; that of an absent king residing in England.  This reality increased Scotland’s
likelihood of having a king largely out of touch with their needs and their culture.  The
absence of the king also fostered the rise of Scotland’s “new” men.  Traditionally,
Scottish society revolved around the king, yet without his physical presence in the
country, he was forced to rely increasingly upon the nobility to carry out his will.  In fact,
from 1603 to 1641 the size of the Scottish nobility practically doubled.4  Thus Scotland’s
new men were becoming increasingly more important in the governing of the country.
In Scotland, religion held a particular prominence.  Religion was the cornerstone
of society and people depended on it in the everyday workings of their lives.  The
importance placed on religion did not lay in its structure but rather in its practice.  Thus
any changes to religious practice in Scotland provoked widespread unrest and agitation.
James I did reinsert bishops into the Scottish Presbyterian system, much to the dismay of
his Scottish subjects, yet it was Charles who elevated the bishops’ positions within the
Scottish system at the expense of traditional Presbyterian practices and regulations.  This
                                                 
3 David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-1644, (Great Britain: David & Charles;
Newton Abbot, 1973), 15.
4 Ibid, 18.
6gave Charles a trustworthy power base in Scotland, however ultimately it was his attempt
at anglicizing the Kirk of Scotland that provoked widespread outrage and open hostility
toward the crown.  In fact, the new king hoped to form his countries into “…an Anglo-
centric ‘empire’: a unity in which the two kingdoms of the Celtic fringe, Scotland and
Ireland, were to be subordinated – and in part assimilated – to the religion and
government of England…”5  His first act toward this Anglicization came in 1625 with the
Act of Revocation, which rescinded grants and gifts of royal property given particularly
to nobles since 1542.  This was an extreme revocation as it included both royal and Kirk
property.  Although Charles’ intentions concerning this revocation were moderate, it was
a direct attempt to establish his power in Scotland at the expense of his subjects.6
The relationship between England and Scotland can be characterized by extreme
antagonism.  This antagonism was particularly vicious in the 16th century.  For example,
Scotland lost two kings within the span of twenty-nine years.  In 1513 James IV was
killed at the battle of Flodden fighting the English, leaving his toddler son as king.  In
turn, James V died at Falkland Palace after his crushing defeat at the hands of the English
at the battle of Solway Moss in 1542.  Instead of leaving a male successor however,
James V left an infant daughter, Mary, as the heir to the Scottish throne.  This event
prompted the English to pounce on their demoralized neighbor by beginning the Rough
Wooings led by Henry VIII.  This period was characterized by Henry VIII’s repeated
attempts to marry his son Edward to Mary, in an effort to join the two countries together.
When negotiation failed, Henry forced his idea upon the Scots through violence, which
                                                 
5 John Adamson, The Noble Revolt, the Overthrow of Charles I, (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 2007), 4.
6 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 35.
7also led to failure.  These instances are only a sampling of all of the actual violence
existing between Scotland and England contributing to their mutual antagonism.
Religion was also another key area of friction between Scotland and England.
Both countries underwent reformations, however the Scots viewed their reformation as
the purest in existence.  Thus they saw Presbyterianism as superior to their English
counterpart; Anglicism and the Church of England.
Scotland, like England, exhibited desires and motivations in their neighboring
country.  In fact, long had the Scots desired the control of the English throne.  This want
only heightened after the death of Henry VIII and his third act of succession, which
reinstated the previously illegitimate daughters of Henry VIII, Mary and Elizabeth, after
their brother Edward in the English succession.  This was highly contentious, as both
children were previously deemed illegitimate through the proceedings Henry himself
initiated against their mothers, Catherine of Aragon and Anne Boleyn.  Thus an argument
formed that promoted Mary Queen of Scots as the true heir to the English throne after
Henry’s son Edward, as her grandmother was Henry VIII’s sister.  France, who wished to
dominate both Scotland and England, greatly supported this argument. This contention
concerning Mary Queen of Scots was also perpetuated through her son James in his quest
for the English throne, which he eventually acquired in 1603 when he became James I of
England.
Like the relationship between Scotland and England, the relationship between
Scotland and France was equally deep-seated.  However, the relationship between France
and Scotland was not marked by antagonism but by friendship.  The two countries were
united through the long standing Auld Alliance.  This alliance began on 23 October 1295
8with the Treaty of Paris, which was an offensive and defensive alliance negotiated
between John Balliol, King of Scots, and Philip IV of France.7  From that time forth, even
through periodic ruptures, the alliance remained intact.  One of the major obstacles to the
Auld Alliance was the reformation in Scotland, which removed one of the key aspects of
the alliance; Catholicism.  However, the significant unifying force associated with the
Auld Alliance stood intact; the need to act together against their common enemy, the
English.
In the 16th century the Alliance found itself weakened through divisions of
religion.  Yet it was soon revived through Mary of Guise who married James V of
Scotland.  Mary came from a prominent French family with strong ties to Henri II, King
of France.  Mary of Guise’s strong tie to France reinstalled strong Franco-Scottish
connections in both countries.  The Alliance was further solidified with Henry VIII’s
Rough Wooings, as the French actively supported the Scots against the English.  Henri II
insisted France should protect “‘ce pauvre royaume d’Escosse [poor Scotland]’ from
falling under the sway of England…” while he also wanted  “…to make Scotland ‘his’
and thirdly to unite the three Kingdoms of France, Scotland, and England into one self-
same monarchy…”8  Instead of marrying Mary Queen of Scots into the English
monarchy, Mary of Guise signed the Treaty of Haddington, which set up Mary Queen of
Scots’ marriage to the French Dauphin.  The French and Mary of Guise also had the
backing of the Scottish nation as “Most of the political nation did not want union with
England and to avoid it, they were prepared to become a French client, to allow their
                                                 
7 Norman Macdougall, An Antidote to the English: The Auld Alliance, 1295-1560, (East
Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2001), 1.
8 Marcus Meriman, The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots 1542-1551, (East Linton:
Tuckwell Press, 2000), 296.
9queen to be raised in France and to postpone consideration of the implications of her
marriage to the Dauphin.”9  The treaty essentially made Scotland a French satellite state,
and in 1558 with the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots to the French Dauphin, Scotland
became the keystone for French imperial design.  The reality of Scotland becoming
incorporated in a French empire occurred when Mary Queen of Scots signed secret
documents preceding her marriage stating that should she die without children her rights
to Scotland and the English succession would be transferred to France.10  Henri II would
thus have access to not only Scotland but England for his imperial designs.  After the
failure of Henri’s dream of empire, the Franco-Scottish link again grew slight.   Thus, it
is apparent that France often used the Auld Alliance to further their own ends and needs
without regard to the consequences in Scotland.
In addition to renewed ties in the 16th century, Scotland continued to send troops
to France.  This too aided the French with their involvement in wars on the continent.
For example, in 1638 Cardinal Richelieu wrote to the French ambassador in London at
the time, Monsieur de Bellièvre, concerning the acquisition of Scottish troops, stating that
Louis XIII, the King of France,
…a pris un singulier plaisir à sçavoir les particularitez de ce qui s’est passé [sur ce
sujet] en Angleterre, et n’en a pas un petit ressentiment.  Il a esté aussy très ayse
de voir l’espérance que la reyne d’Angleterre vous donne d’obtenir la permission
de la levee des 2 régimens escossois…plus volontiers qu’il est advantageux au roy
de la Gr. Br. de tirer des Escossois d’Escosse, en ce temps où il y a du trouble en
ce royaume…11
                                                 
9 Jane Dawson, Scotland Re-formed 1488-1587, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2007), 173.
10 Ibid, 193.
11 M. Avenel, ed., Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d’état du Cardinal de
Richelieu, vol. 6, 1638-1642 (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale), 212, Cardinal Richelieu to M.
de Bellièvre, 26 September/6 October 1638.
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The utilization of Scottish troops once again typifies the Franco-Scottish relationship as
one of convenience and advantage for the French.  Yet the presence of Scottish troops
also signified that a link still existed between the two countries.  The French were also
aware and kept abreast of the rumblings that began in Scotland in 1637.
Like Scotland and England’s relationship, the relationship between England and
France was also marked with antagonism and hostility.  English kings had long laid claim
to the French throne.  This claim was renewed notably in the 16th century with Henry VIII
who actively claimed he was the true King of France in 1513 and again in 1544.  This
added to the rivalry and hostility between England and France.  Yet these two countries
were allies when it suited their needs and interests.  In 1625 Louis XIII’s sister, Henrietta
Maria, married Charles I in order to prevent Charles from aligning with French
Protestants or with Spain.12  However the marriage designed to improve the relationship
between the two countries, or at least aid France from a strictly French perspective, was
quickly ruptured when Charles expelled the Catholics from Henrietta Maria’s chamber.13
However it was the matter of the Palatine in the 1630s that dominated the
relationship between Scotland, France, and England.  This matter sparked the Thirty
Years War with a Protestant union against the Habsburg Empire with Frederick the
Elector of Palatine at its head.  The need for Charles to settle the matter gained greater
prominence when Frederick died leaving his son and Charles I’s nephew, Charles Louis,
Elector of Palatine.14  The French wanted the English to align themselves with France
                                                 
12 A. Lloyd Moote, Louis XIII, the Just, (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 181.
13 Hubert Méthivier, Le Siècle de Louis XIII, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1967), 63.
14 Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), 72.
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against the Habsburg Empire.  This position set up the need for France to be on amicable
terms with the English.  By August 1635 the English and French seemed to actually be
getting along as the French inquired into a possible alliance between the two.15  Thus the
French found themselves in the precarious position of maintaining an amicable
relationship with England and Charles I while also maintaining open dealings with the
Scots.
Scotland, France, and England all possessed highly complex relationships with
one another in part due to the experiences of their rulers.  Charles I’s behavior and ruling
style were greatly influenced by his childhood and his strained relationship with his
father, James I and VI.  Charles grew up in the shadow of his older brother Henry, whose
death in 1612 shattered James.  Instead of placing his love and favor upon his second son,
Charles, James instead focused this attention on one of his court favorites, George
Villiers, the duke of Buckingham.  This alienation from his father turned Charles against
many of James’ innovations at the English court as well as his many Scottish behaviors
including familiarity at court, which “…separated the prince from the centre of Scottish
influence at the English court – the entourage in the royal bedchamber…”16  When
Charles took the throne in 1625 his rebellion against his father’s Scottish ways was vastly
apparent as he created a court of strict formality and ceremony which only proved to
further remove him from his Scottish and English subjects.  Yet his Scottish subjects bore
the brunt of his ways, as they were forced to adopt English manners when seeing him to
receive even the slightest hope of favor.17
                                                 
15 Ibid, 526.
16 Ibid, 774.
17 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 17.
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Although it is believed that Charles spoke with a Scottish accent, he retained little
else from the country of his birth.  Charles was much more anglicized than his father,
leading to further alienation from his Scottish subjects.  In time his Scottish subjects also
began to resent Charles as he deprived many nobles from what they believed to be their
fair share in the government of Scotland.18  In addition to this increased alienation of his
Scottish subjects, Charles embarked on a very Anglo-centric foreign and religious policy.
In 1633 Charles finally visited Scotland for his coronation, and while there he appeared
to be very uncomfortable with Scottish ways.  In addition, he ordered the reconstruction
of St. Giles Church in Edinburgh into one large cathedral.19  This action helped signal that
religion was to be a key and ultimately damaging issue in Scotland.20  Charles and his key
religious advisor the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, “…made no secret their
intention to Anglicize the Kirk; for the first time, it was what London wanted which
almost exclusively directed ecclesiastical policy.  The Five Articles [of Perth] were
pushed with renewed vigor.”21   Ultimately it would be Charles’ disregard, or rather his
unwillingness to comprehend his Scottish subjects and their devotion to Presbyterianism,
which brought about rebellion.
Charles also instituted controversial measures in England so he could rule without
parliament.  He invoked the ship money levy to bring funds into the government.  Ship
money was traditionally levied in coastal towns to provide funds to safeguard England’s
seas.  However when Charles began the levy
                                                 
18 Ibid, 30.
19 Jenny Wormald, Scotland A History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 156.
20 Ibid, 156.
21 Ibid, 156.
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Opposition to it mounted, but only when it became apparent that the rate was to
become an annual one, and the King’s discretionary power to proclaim a
permanent state of emergency was questioned…But it was not until the summer
of 1639 that the opposition became effective.22
Ship money was a hated and costly levy that would become a key concern once Charles
finally did call a parliament.
Early in his reign, Charles embarked on a series of military ventures including
disastrous wars with France and Spain.  These undertakings were extremely unpopular
and Charles eventually withdrew.  He then ruled without parliament causing some to call
this time period the “Eleven Years of Tyranny.”23  Although removed from continental
war, Charles still pursued the restitution of the Palatine.  Clearly Charles exhibited
weaknesses in his rule, however the most crucial can be broken down as such;
…he was incapable of acknowledging the political manoeuvering within
constitutional assemblies was not necessarily intended to obstruct or reverse royal
initiatives.  Secondly…Charles consistently pushed his prerogative to the limit
without convincingly demonstrating the present necessity for authoritarian rule.
Thirdly, Charles tended to view criticism, however informed, as subversive and
even seditious.24
These weaknesses would ultimately lead to Charles I’s downfall.
Charles I’s counterpart in France was Louis XIII, son of Henri IV.  Louis was
born in 1601 and had a different yet equally troubling childhood as Charles I.  In 1610
Louis’ father was murdered.  Louis immediately became king and his mother, Marie de
Medici, acted as regent.  Her regency was exceptionally rocky as she became too attached
                                                 
22 John Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces: the People of England and the Tragedies of War
1630-1648, 2nd ed., (London: Longman, 1999), 39.
23 John Kenyon and Jane Ohlymeyer, eds, The Civil Wars: A Military History of England,
Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11
24 Allan I. Macinnes, The British Revolution, 1629-1660, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), 75.
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to her Italian friends intent on maintaining their political influence.25  Marie also
dismissed the great French finance minister, Sully, which made others extremely
cautious.  Thus, Louis grew up with the realization that his mother’s regency was steadily
eroding France.26  In November 1630 Marie de Medici went into exile following the Day
of Dupes, in which the enemies of Cardinal Richelieu believed they succeeded in ousting
him from power, only to find that he remained Louis’ closest advisor.
Louis was a precocious child.  He was also vehemently anti-Spanish, often calling
them “papa’s enemies.”27  Throughout his life Louis remained staunchly against the
Spanish, often courting Charles I into an alliance against them.  In 1635 Louis declared
war on Spain, later followed by conflict with the Habsburg Emperor, Ferdinand.28  Louis
also faced opposition from the Huguenot’s during his reign, which he brutally put down.
Yet one of the overwhelming conclusions about Louis XIII’s reign was that Cardinal
Richelieu, not Louis, controlled France.  However Louis was always involved in the
decisions made during his reign.  He exhibited his own point of view concerning the
world; he detested the Spanish and Habsburg Empire for the duration of his life, and he
insisted upon a policy of toleration with the Huguenots, though he put down their
rebellion as he saw it as unprovoked.29
Louis’ most trusted advisor was Cardinal Richelieu who rose to power quickly
during Louis’ reign.  Richelieu was exceptionally good at reading the king and the two
men complimented each other.  Louis understood his duties, yet was often restless and
                                                 
25 Moote, Louis XIII, 41.
26 Ibid, 41.
27 Ibid, 49.
28 Ibid, 239.
29 Ibid, 296.
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failed go beyond routine and rarely thought outside the box.30  Richelieu on the other
hand, was a “…workaholic who liked to concentrate on the whole problem, but he
needed privacy to be at his best.”31  The two quickly developed a rapport of mutual
confidence and collaboration.32  This allowed Richelieu to consolidate his power swiftly.
He also attempted to control Louis’ council and important offices within the French state
by utilizing those loyal to him.33  Thus, Richelieu played a highly significant role during
Louis’ reign, shaping domestic as well as foreign policy.
As a people, the Scots were bound to the practice of their religion.  Discontent
with Charles’ religious policies had been brewing since the early 1630s, and the prayer
book was the tipping point.  In actuality Charles made all Scottish grievances - high
taxation, dissatisfied nobles, the Five Articles of Perth, the position and elevation of
bishops - worse through his
…secretiveness, tactlessness and arrogance.  He consistently refused to take
account of the opinions and feelings of his subjects.  Convinced of the rightness
of his religions and other policies, and of his duty to impose them, he would have
regarded it as a betrayal of his trust to change them in the face of opposition by
subjects who had, as he believed, no right to impose him.34
On 23 July 1637 the new Scottish Prayer Book, orchestrated by Charles and Laud, was
read in Edinburgh.  The book did not fall in line with Presbyterianism, but instead was
much more concurrent with Church of England doctrine.  The book also undermined how
the Scots viewed their relationship with God and the Presbyterian doctrine of
                                                 
30 Ibid, 161.
31 Ibid, 161.
32 Méthivier, Le Siècle, 44.
33 Moote, Louis XIII, 166.
34 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 51-52.
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predestination.  When the book was read in St Giles Church in Edinburgh, Jenny Geddes
threw a stool at the minister reading the book, igniting the Scottish rebellion.
Charles faced increasingly open opposition to the prayer book, yet he remained
resolute in his insistence on the implementation of the book.  He was furious that his
subjects had disobeyed him and instructed that those responsible for the riots and
disturbances in Scotland be punished.  Charles also ordered the Scottish bishops to
continue reading the prayer book as previously planned.35  However disturbances in
Scotland mainly led by nobles, continued to spread.  On 28 February 1638 the National
Covenant was signed in Edinburgh.  The document was then passed around the country
for others to sign.  It was “violently” anti-Catholic, calling for the defense of true
religion.36  The Covenant also called for the renewal of the old covenant signed by James
VI.37  It seemed as though the struggle against Charles I was inevitable as “…there war
abuses in both kingdomes that merit reformatioun…in kirk and pollicie, whiche the
countrie culd not get repairit so long as bischopis stood, who wes ane of the thrie estaites
of parliament, follouit still the King, and in materis questionable thair votes kest the
ballance.”38  It was also abundantly clear that the bishops had to be removed in Scotland,
and in December the Glasgow Assembly was held.  The Assembly did away with the
Five Articles of Perth, made episcopacy illegal, and removed all bishops and
archbishops.39  However Charles could not tolerate this kind of insubordination as his
Scottish subjects were directly threatening his authority.  In fact Archibald Johnston of
                                                 
35 Ibid, 64.
36 Wormald, Scotland, 158.
37 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 82.
38 John Spalding, Memorialls of the Trubles in Scotland and in England. A.D. 1624-A.D.
1645, vol. 1, (Aberdeen: Printed for the Spalding Club, 1850), 129.
39 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 124.
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Wariston, a very religious lawyer, went so far as to express a desire for the French to
invade England, and more importantly a desire for Charles’ deposition “…by the Lord’s
removal of Charles.”40  Thus, preparations for war began on both sides, as the collision
course toward war proved inevitable.
In preparation for war the Scots sent propaganda into England in an attempt to
explain what brought about the impending war.  Needless to say, the king was furious
with the propaganda and the proceedings in Scotland for war.  Robert Baillie the Scottish
minister wrote that Charles’
…rage was increased by his disappoyntment in all his designes among us; he was
on his way; there was nothing now able to divert him from pursueing of us with
fyre and sword bot the God of heaven…we did never dispaire, hoping still that the
goodnes of God would never permitt so gracious a Prince to defile his hands in
the blood of so loving subjects, for no cause at all bot their opposition to that
corruption and tyrannie they were bringing, under the colour of his name, both
into Church and State.41
Baillie acknowledged that the Scottish people were upset not with Charles but with his
bishops in Scotland and with Laud.  Thus they were still loyal to the king but not to his
corrupt religious officials.
Yet the course was already set for war and troops on both sides began to mass.
With the swift approach of war, Alexander Leslie returned to Scotland to help fight.
Leslie, born in Scotland, was a military man through and through.  He served in the
Swedish army, had been knighted by Gustavus Adolphus on 23 September 1627, and had
                                                 
40 G.M. Paul, ed, The Diary of Archibald Johnston Lord Wariston 1639, (Edinburgh,
1896: Scottish Historical Society, XXVI), 390, discussion about armed resistance, 20/30
September 1638.
41 Robert Baillie, The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, vol. I, (Edinburgh, 1841),
198.
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been appointed the governor of Stralsund.42  Indeed, Leslie was so well thought of “…his
valour and good lvk attained to this title his Excellence, inferiour to none bot to the King
of Swaden…”43  Leslie also led a force of Scots in the Thirty Years War, as he believed
he was really serving Charles I in restoring his nephew as Elector of Palatine.44  He
intended on serving the king directly should he decide to raise an army in the war.
However after a brief visit to Scotland, Leslie changed his point of view dramatically, as
he began to see the Scots’ struggle against Charles as a great European religious
struggle.45  He was extremely affected by what he saw in Scotland, as he previously
believed Charles to be one of the protestant kings standing up to Catholicism.46  Yet now
“Serving the covenant, he revealed, he regarded as a matter of defending religion and
national liberty.”47  Leslie’s return to Scotland greatly aided the Scottish cause, as he had
a wealth of practical military knowledge and service.
The Scots also greatly desired the support of the English people.  Many
Englishmen understood the war to be a priests’ war or a war for their priests, as the Scots
rejected the Book of Common Prayer and Episcopal government.48  In addition, many
Englishmen did not want to go to war with the Scots.  They believed if the war were
                                                 
42 David Stevenson, “Leslie, Alexander, first earl of Leven (c. 1580-1661),” Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford University Press, 2004),
http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/view/article/16482?docPos=2,
(accessed 15 November 2008), 1.
43 Spalding, Memorialls, 130.
44 Stevenson, “Leslie, Alexander,” 1.
45 Ibid, 2.
46 Ibid, 2.
47 Ibid, 2.
48 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I. 1639-1640.
edited by William Douglas Hamilton, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1877),
5, Answer of John Oneby, Counsellor at Law to the complaint of John Moore, 2 October
1639.
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successful they would be placed in an even more subservient position below the king.49
Nor did they want to support a war that could make the calling of parliament even more
obsolete if successful.  The Scottish war was also highly unpopular among the English
people, as they had no desire to fight their neighbors to the north.
Yet Charles pushed forward.  In 1639 the war began in Aberdeen, a notorious
bastion of Catholicism in Scotland.  To the dismay of Charles, the Scots ended up taking
the city.  Even early on the English did not do well.  With news of these troubles,
Charles’ belief that the French were behind the Scottish rebellion grew.50  However in
reality, the French were not supporting the Scots.  Regardless of the disappointing
progress of the war for the English, Charles still believed that underneath it all the Scots
were loyal to him.51  This depicts how unrealistic Charles’ mindset really was toward his
Scottish subjects.
Charles continued to be proven wrong, and by June he was convinced that the
Scots possessed a large military force, largely due to a Scottish bluff.  This prompted
Charles into negotiation and in June the Treaty of Berwick was concluded.  The treaty
stipulated that all property that belonged to the king or royalists was to be returned, it
freed imprisoned royalists, and it stated that the Covenanters could not hold any meetings
that were against the law.  In return Charles would withdraw his forces from Scotland,
give all Scottish property and men that had been seized back to Scotland, and he would
                                                 
49 Samuel Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of
the Civil War 1603-1642 Vol. IX. 1639-1641, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1891), 11.
50 Ibid, 7.
51 Ibid, 9.
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call a general assembly and parliament in August.52  However, the treaty was merely an
attempt by Charles to buy more time to conduct his next military campaign against the
Scots.  He had absolutely no intention of keeping to anything stipulated in the Treaty of
Berwick.  The same month the treaty was concluded, Charles set about outfitting and
fortifying Edinburgh Castle.53  This greatly alarmed many Scots and signified that in no
way could Charles be trusted.
Charles did allow a Scottish parliament and assembly to meet, a measure meant
merely pacify the Scots.  In parliament, the Scots came up with demands they should
have raised when negotiating the Treaty of Berwick.  They wanted firm constitutional
changes.  The Scots called for the official abolition of episcopacy, the deprivation of
votes of bishops in parliament, and the Scottish command of the major castles –
Edinburgh, Stirling, and Dumbarton.54  In short, what parliament was really after was the
control of the country.  Charles saw this as direct disobedience, and he ordered the
parliament be prorogued until March, again buying him time to properly attack the
Scots.55  The Scots were not ignorant of Charles’ actions and they began to worry.  On 12
August 1639 a leader of the covenanting movement, the earl of Rothes, expressed that it
was not his intention to overthrow episcopacy in Ireland or England.  He stated that this
idea “was farr from my thoughts.”56  Rothes also professed his loyalty to Charles I.  Thus,
in an attempt to rid themselves of the rumor concerning the overthrow of episcopacy
outside Scotland, the Scots attempted to quash some of the tension between themselves
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and the king.  Similarly, on 23 November 1639 another leading covenanter, Lord
Loudoun, wrote to Charles’ most trusted Scottish advisor, the marquis of Hamilton.
Loudoun wrote of the need to remedy the problems between Charles and the
Covenanters, and hoped Charles would meet with Scottish commissioners to view their
petition.57
The world was not ignorant of the ongoing events in England and Scotland.  In
fact the French were closely watching the proceedings between Scotland and England.
The French had several main concerns.  First of all, they were worried that the Scottish
rebellion would push England closer to Spain, France’s mortal enemy.  The French were
also concerned that they were losing the allegiance of the Scots.  On 25 February 1639
the French ambassador in England, Bellièvre, wrote “J’ay descouvert que nos Ennemis se
servent en Escosse du nom de ce Gentilhomme en la façon que je vous mande, pour nous
y faire perdre nos amis…”58  It is clear from Bellièvre’s statement that he was concerned
that France’s enemies installed agents in Scotland and that Scotland may be turning
against France.  At the same time, the French were still very cautious to remain on good
terms with the English as they hoped the English would aid them against Spain and the
Habsburg Empire.
Charles also became increasingly alienated from France due to the arrest and
detention of the Elector of Palatine in France.  This alienation was bolstered by Charles’
belief that the French, specifically Cardinal Richelieu, were behind the tumult in
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Scotland.59  In addition to his fears concerning French support for the Scots, Charles was
also beginning to believe that the Scots were turning France against England.  In a letter
to the English Ambassador in Paris, the earl of Leicester, Charles wrote that the Scots
were “…endeavoring to raise jealousies and misunderstandings between us and such of
our neighbours as we are most nearly allied to, and with whom we desire to hold the most
firm and inviolable friendship.”60  This was a real threat to Charles, as he even asked
Leicester to meet with the French King to profess England’s sincere friendship to France.
Charles’ overture to the French was clearly an indication of the need to keep France as an
ally and friend, and avoid complete alienation.
France was also gravely troubled by the developments in England.  In January the
French noticed the accumulation of levies raised to fight the Scots, and they feared the
amount was far too great for that fight alone.  Instead they believed that England made a
treaty with the Spanish and Dutch against them.61  Later that month the Venetian
Ambassador at The Hague noted English levies to raise 15,000 infantry and 2,000 horses;
This is ascribed to some hidden intention against France in case the disturbances
in Scotland are settled.  But the Dutch ambassador in France writes that the
French are keeping an eye on this and at the opening of parliament they will direct
their attention to conciliating the goodwill of that body and preventing any
accident.62
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The former French Ambassador to England, Bellièvre, promptly dispelled this notion.63
Yet the idea of possible war with the English lingered.  The possibility that the English
were considering an alliance with the Spanish and Dutch also concerned the French.64
This posed an enormous threat to France - militarily and economically.
Even though they desired the friendship of England against the Spanish and the
Dutch, the French continued to pursue levies of Scottish troops.  This was a frequent
topic of discussion within French correspondence particularly in 1639.  The levies were
also a mask for something deeper.  Cardinal Richelieu’s almoner, a Scottish Jesuit by the
name of Thomas Chambers, made several visits to Scotland in the late 1630s.  The
missions, justified by the recruitment of Scots into the French army, established a link
between France and the Covenanters.  The English were not blind to this development.
On the contrary the earl of Leicester wrote to English Secretary of State Coke in March
about the identity of the Scotsman and his relationship to the French Court and Cardinal
Richelieu.  As a test Leicester recommended that Chambers be asked to take the Oath of
Allegiance at Dover, which he believed Chambers would fail.65  This test was indicative
of English distrust toward Catholics and the French.  It is suspected that Chambers really
acted as Richelieu’s ambassador to the Covenanters, expressing “goodwill” and
negotiating contracts.66  His role is believed to have expanded with the Bishops’ Wars as
he became “...the unofficial Scottish ambassador to the French Court.”67  However his
real tie remains somewhat unclear.  On 14 March 1639 the French Ambassador in
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London, Bellièvre, discussed Chambers in his letter back to France.  In the letter
Bellièvre expressed his fear that the role of Chambers in England would be
misinterpreted, leading to allegations by the English about French support of the Scottish
rebellion;
L’arrivée de M. de Chambres fera soupçonner icy toutes choses contraires à vos
intentions: l’on s’imaginera en consequence de tous les bruits que l’on fait courir,
et des opinions que l’on a eue qu’il vient pour fomenter la guerre d’Escosse: non
seulement, le peuple, mais aussi beaucoup de personnes de qualité ont pris telle
jalousie de nous que tout leur donne de soupçon.68
Chamber’s role in Scotland is thus somewhat ambiguous.  The French choice in sending
a Scot back to Scotland to levy troops is clearly suspect.  However the concern shown by
Bellièvre must be taken into account as it exhibits the French fear of angering the
English.  Thus, the real extent of Chamber’s role in Scotland as a French agent remains
undefined.  However his presence does signify a move to return to the Auld Alliance of
days gone past.
Charles was still extremely wary of the French, as he still believed they were
behind the Scottish rebellion.  Due to this belief, Charles realized France’s worst fear by
drifting more and more toward Spain.  For example, in August 1639 Charles allowed a
large Spanish fleet to enter English waters near Dover.  This greatly dismayed the
English people who could think of nothing other than the Spanish armada that Queen
Elizabeth had so valiantly defeated in the 16th century.  A battle between the Spanish and
the Dutch ensued shortly thereafter.  The Dutch won leaving Charles to mediate between
the two.  Perhaps the most important aspect to come out of the negotiation were the secret
provisions made with Spain.  Charles told the Spanish that if they continued to do “so
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little” for the Elector of Palatine, they would not be greeted with “many courtesies” in
England.69  Charles was indeed growing closer to Spain while still protecting his interests
in the Palatine.  Yet the French also gained from the battle between the Dutch and
Spanish.  Waiting until a Dutch victory was at hand, Bellièvre somehow won Henrietta
Maria back over to the French side.  It has never been discovered how Bellièvre
accomplished this, yet it was a significant accomplishment as Henrietta Maria, up until
that point, had been an ardent supporter of Spain.   This odd occurrence took place when
her mother went into exile, angering Henrietta Maria and turning her against France.  In
any case, her conversion back to the French side also brought about her husband’s switch.
Shortly after Henrietta Maria gave her support to France, Charles did as well.  Charles
told the Dutch that he would abandon the Spanish if the French made the Prince of
Palatine head of the army commanded by the staunch Protestant Bernard of Weimar.70
However amicable the Anglo-Franco relationship became after this point, it was quickly
soured by the Prince of Palatine’s arrest later in the year by the French.
Even while the French were negotiating with the English, they were still levying
troops in Scotland.  In fact, the leading covenanter the earl of Argyll, the earl of Rothes,
and Alexander Leslie promised Bellièvre they would send Scottish troops to France as
soon as their conflict with Charles I was resolved; “…ils me promettent qu’aussytost que
leurs affairs seront terminées, non seulement ils souffriront que M. Erskine face sa levée,
mais aussy contribueront ce qu’ils pourront du leur à faire que se soient de gens
aguerris.”71  By November some Scottish troops arrived in France and Bellièvre
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instructed that they be well received and well treated.72  From these interactions, it can be
assumed that the Scots and the French were concocting come sort of mutual agreement.
Clearly the French were receiving Scottish troops in return for the aid they sent or
planned to send to Scotland.  Thus the Auld Alliance was once again acting as a mutually
beneficial alliance.
In July 1639 the Scots received more encouraging news from France, or at least
from M. de Bellièvre.  On 27 June 1639, Bellièvre expressed his desire to send
commissioners to Scotland to reassert the Auld Alliance.73  This was a distinct switch
from Bellièvre’s previous position regarding the Scots.  Initially, Bellièvre expressed
little sympathy toward the rebellious Scots.  However his attitude changed as he saw
firsthand what Charles I was doing to the Scots, and he began to actively encourage
French support for the Scots.  This switch was also due to the appearance of the Prince of
Palatine in England who was visiting his uncle.  On 30 July, Bellièvre again expressed
the need to send commissioners to Scotland to ensure that the Scots did not make any
agreement with England that was unfavorable to the French;
…j’estime extrémement nécessaire d’envoyer en Escosse quelque personne fidèle
qui ait soing de nos interests et qui travaille à empescher que les Escossois ne
s’accommodent avec les Anglois, au moins à nostre prejudice, et que dans cet
accord, il y ait des clauses qui obligent les Anglois à ne se brouiller jamais avec
nous sans estre assurez d’avoir en mesme temps les Escossois pour ennemis.74
Essentially, Bellièvre reasserted the Auld Alliance by stating that if the English reverted
to a hostile policy that hurt the French, they could count on having Scotland as an enemy
as well as France.  This definitive statement fully supported the Scots’ plight against the
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English, if only for the true benefit of France.  Thus, the French teetered on a very narrow
edge between maintaining an amicable relationship with England and angering them by
their illusive dealings with the Scots.  The traditional antagonistic relationship between
the French and the English was clearly still intact as was the Auld Alliance.
Meanwhile, the Scottish parliament was still seeking confirmation for the acts
they passed.  However it was reported by the earl of Northumberland in October that;
The affaires in Scottland are att this tyme in more desperate condition then ever,
the actes they have lately passed in their parlament are so exorbitant and their
demands so insolent that it can never be expected the King should give way unto
their desirs, for now they goe about to change the whole frame of their goverment,
and to deuest the King of all regall power…75
It became readily apparent that neither side was going to capitulate, especially when the
Scots kept adding to their demands, which further devalued Charles’ power.  In
November in an attempt to work with Charles two commissioners, Loudoun and the earl
of Dunfermline, were sent to London to seek the king’s confirmation of the acts passed in
the Scottish parliament.76  While in London, Loudoun paid a visit to Bellièvre.  In the
meeting Loudoun expressed Scotland’s goodwill and respect toward France, especially
concerning the protection France provided Scotland in times of necessity.  Loudoun also
promised not to enter into any treaty with Charles I that did not concur with the
following;
…que l’ancienne Alliance entre les Rois et Royaumes de France et d’Escosse sera
en tièrement restablie: _  le Roy d’Angleterre ne pourra entre prendre aucune
guerre sans l’avis et le consentement du Parlement d’Escosse, et s’il le fait
autrement,  les Escossois ne seront tenus de prendre part dans le conseil des
affairs Estrangères près de la personne de Roy d’Angleterre il y aura doresnarent
des Escossois qui pendront garde que rien ne se resolve qui préjudicie à leurs
alliances: _ Que les Rois d’Angleterre et leurs fils auront des Escossois en chaque
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office de leur maison: _ Que le Roy d’Angleterre trouvera bon que les Escossois
tiennent un agent à la cour de France, ainsy qu’ils font à la Haye.77
The Auld Alliance had thus been virtually reestablished.  This renegotiated proposal put
together by Bellièvre and Loudoun was favorable to both France and Scotland against
England.  Scotland and France clearly became increasingly intertwined.
However productive Loudoun’s meeting with Bellièvre was, the meeting with
Charles was not, for Charles refused to even see the Scottish deputies.  Now more than
ever preparations for war were pushed.  In February 1640 soldiers arrived at Leith outside
of Edinburgh to reinforce Edinburgh Castle.  This greatly shocked the Scots who feared
an imminent shelling of the city.78  They were caught seemingly unaware with the coming
of this war or at least the speed at which it was approaching.   It also seemed as though
the king was much better prepared this time around.  For Charles, the impending war
against the Scots “…was a war of self-affirmation against those who doubted his
judgement within the court, and of eventual revenge against his enemies outside it.”79
Yet he still lacked one thing; money.  Charles was in desperate need to finance the war
and in December 1639 to a council of lords he stated “…because it concerns us highly,
and the safety of our kingdoms, that timely preparations be made for this great action,
which cannot suffer the least delay, but requires a quick and vigorous supply of moneys
for the present raising of forces…”80  The need for money was truly pressing and if
Charles wanted to wage another war against Scotland in 1640 he would be forced to call
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a parliament.  Yet now he felt secure in his decision to call a parliament, as he possessed
what he believed to be the ultimate damning piece of evidence against the Scots; an
intercepted letter written by the Covenanters to Louis XIII.  Thus, Charles called for a
parliament to be held in April 1640.
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Chapter 2
A Treasonous Superscription
“The Superscription of the Letter is this.  AU ROY.”81  The Short Parliament
opened in April 1640 with the reading of a letter sent by the Scottish Covenanters to the
King of France, Louis XIII.  The main point of contention for Charles I, King of England,
Scotland, and Ireland, lay in the letter’s superscription,
For the nature of which Superscription, it is well known to all that know the style
of France, that is it never written by any French man to any, but to their own
king; and therefore being directed (AU ROY) it is to their own King…they do by
that Superscription acknowledge.8283
Leading Covenanters wrote the letter to the King of France in an attempt to call for aid
against the English in what would become the Second Bishops’ War.  The letter was in
fact a direct call for help,
Votre Majesté (estant l’asyle & sanctuaire des Princes & Estats affligéz) nous
avons trouvé necessaire d’envoyer ce Gentillomme le Sieur de Colvil, pour
representer a V.M. la candeur & nainetê tant de nos actions & procedures, que de
nos intentions, lesquelles nous desirons estre graveés & escrites à tout l’univers
avec un ray du Soleil, aussy bien qu’a V.M.84*
Charles immediately perceived the letter as an act of treason.  The letter would in fact
play a minute role in the events of 1640 in Scotland, France, and England.  However, it
did create international repercussions that would influence all three countries.
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The Scots clearly maintained ties to France significant enough to send them a
letter calling for aid.  Nevertheless, presenting their traditional ally with an overture for
aid was an entirely different and drastic step.  To do so was a risky yet bold move, which
required the support of strong and distinguished individuals.  The eventual signatories of
the 1639 letter were all such men, some of whom became prominent in the covenanting
movement.  Seven men in total signed the letter to France, they were John Campbell the
first earl of Loudoun, John Leslie the sixth earl of Rothes, James Graham the first
marquis of Montrose, Alexander Leslie the eventual first earl of Leven, Hugh
Montgomery the eventual seventh earl of Eglinton, John Erskine the nineteenth earl of
Mar and a man named Forrester of whom little is known.
Three of the seven signatories stood among the upper echelon of the resistance
against Charles I.  They were Loudoun, Alexander Leslie, and the earl of Rothes.
Loudoun rose to become a central and driving force in Covenanter controlled Scotland.
He began as a commissioner from the Scots to Charles I.  However, Loudoun vehemently
opposed Charles’ religious policies from his accession to the throne.  He wrote against
the king’s coronation oath in Scotland in which Charles swore to protect the bishops.
Loudoun stated that the oath was unprecedented, as his father James I had not sworn to it.
Nor did any other group receive this special treatment, such as the nobility or the barons.
Loudoun’s articulation of this issue reflected the concern of many, “…the taking of this
Oath shall overthrow the King’s course about tithes, hinder that he cannot make himself
immediat superior to the Bishops vassals…give ground to the Church for exemption from
secular obedience…”85  Loudoun continued to be influential, as he played a prominent
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role at the Glasgow Assembly in 1638, in which the Covenanters took control of
Scotland, and reformed Scottish government and worship.
Alexander Leslie became a subscriber of the Covenant because he “…regarded
[it] as a matter of defending religion and national liberty.”86  This was the deciding factor
in Leslie’s return to Scotland.  He now regarded Charles I as a monarch moving
backward toward Catholicism, thus posing a threat to Protestantism in both England and
Scotland.  Leslie also possessed strong ties to the covenanting movement.  He identified
with the Leslie clan in Scotland, which the earl of Rothes’ led, and he was married to one
of Rothes’ daughters.87  Considering his outstanding military career, Leslie was a natural
choice to lead the Covenanting armies.  With his understanding of Scotland and the
military, he created “A modern army…without compromising social structure…”88
Leslie also inspired the Scots “…that in the awesome step of defying their king they not
only had God on their side but a real chance of military success.”89  The success of the
First Bishops’ War for the Scots was largely accredited to Leslie.  As Robert Baillie
fondly recalled
…such was the wisdome and authoritie of that old, little, crooked souldier, that
all, with ane incredible submission, from the beginning to the end, gave over
themselves to be guided by him, as if he had been Great Solyman….yet was the
man’s understanding of our Scotts humours, that gave out, not onlie to the nobles,
bot to verie mean gentlemen, his directions in a verie homelie and simple forme,
as if they had been bot the advyces of their neighbour and companion…90
Leslie again triumphed in the Second Bishops’ War.
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John Leslie the sixth earl of Rothes equally propelled the Covenanter position in
Scotland as a leader of the movement.  He opposed episcopacy in Scotland from the very
moment it was forced upon them by King James, and he voted against the Five Articles
of Perth, articles attempting to instill religious practices on Scotland like those already
found within the Church of England, along with Loudoun in 1621.91  In 1637 with
Loudoun and several others, Rothes “…took offens at his Majesties zealous and godly
governement of this land, both in churche and pollicie.”92  This group also made a
resolution against Charles I to clip his “…wyngis in royall government both in stait and
kirk, and craftellie and quyetlie  tryis the hairtis of the nobles barronis, churche, and
gentrie of England how thay war set, and fand them of the same humour and
miscontentment that them selfis wes of…”93  In addition, he was at the forefront of the
opposition surrounding the introduction of the prayer book to Scotland, and he too played
a prominent role at the Glasgow Assembly.94  Rothes’ was instrumental in bringing
people into the covenanting movement.  His uncompromising attitude toward episcopacy
and religious affairs in Scotland also angered Charles I to the utmost.
  The other signatories also had their own unique ties to the Covenant.  John
Erskine the nineteenth earl of Mar possessed impressive credentials, as he was a knight of
the Bath, a member of the Scottish Privy Council, and governor of Edinburgh Castle.95
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His support for the Covenant began in 1638 yet by the mid-1640s he was accused of
returning to the king’s party, and it has since been deduced that Mar’s varying political
affiliations were mainly influenced by his fluctuating financial situation.96  Mar also
possessed a regiment of Scottish troops in France, thus making him an ideal candidate
and convincing signatory of the letter.97
Hugh Montgomery, the eventual seventh earl of Eglinton, enjoyed strong ties to
the Covenanting movement as he was married to the earl of Rothes’ daughter.  He also
had a strong military background as he spent time in France during the 1630s studying
fortification and serving with the French army.98  Montgomery was a strong opponent of
Charles I’s ecclesiastical policy and thus took up an important role in the Glasgow
Assembly in 1638.99  Thus, when the Bishops’ Wars began Montgomery was given the
post of colonel because of his ardent opposition to Charles I as well as his previous
military experience.100
James Graham the first marquis of Montrose took a much different path to the
covenanting movement.  He was a supporter of Charles I but a meeting with the king in
1636 left him “slighted,” therefore provoking him to switch his allegiance.101  However
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Montrose’s allegiance to the Covenanters did not immediately develop.  According to
Robert Baillie, it was the earl of Rothes who convinced Montrose to join with the
Covenanters, “…When the canniness of Rothes had brought in Montrose to our party, his
more than ordinare and civill pride made him very hard to be guided.”102  From Baillie’s
comment it is clear that Montrose wanted to obtain importance within the upper echelon
of the Covenant from the onset of his involvement.  However Montrose did do some
good for the movement, as he was instrumental in gaining signatures for the National
Covenant.103  Yet it was his desire to attain prominence that made him hotly resented by
many within the covenanting movement.104  For example it was soon apparent that
Montrose’s drive for power occupied his thinking as it was reported that being passed
over for the position of commander-in-chief of the covenanting armies left Montrose
feeling jilted.105
Rothes was not the only signatory to anger Charles.  Loudoun’s dominant position
made him a target as well.  In fact, because of his opposition of the Articles of Perth,
Loudoun had his promotion to earldom halted by Charles due to his uncompromising and
outspoken position.106  He continued however to notify Charles of the Covenanters’
grievances and presented him with a new set in 1639.107  The earl of Mar also made
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Charles I angry with his support of the Covenant and was stripped of his command of
Edinburgh Castle.108
The Covenanters were clearly exploring the idea of foreign intervention in their
conflict, yet they continued to send commissioners to Charles I to negotiate their
differences.  Charles however proved unwilling to speak with them.  These
commissioners were repeatedly rejected or kept waiting for long periods of time.  Each
time Charles seemed to come up with an excuse to refuse them.  For example, in 1639
Lord Loudoun traveled to London with several other Covenanters to talk with Charles
yet,
…heiring of there cuming, causit command them, the commissioneris, not to
approche court be 8 myllis, becaus he had writtin for his commissioner, and wes
detained by his subiectis maist vniustlie, aganes thair othe of allegians, and
contrair to the law of nationis, whairby ane embassador or commissioner may be
recallit be his maister, fra any vther natioun, mekill mair be ane King fra his awin
subiectis, at his plesour.109
The commissioners were refused yet again by Charles, and sent home.
Indeed, Charles often had unreasonable expectations of the Covenanter
commissioners.  On February 17, 1640 he refused to see them “… unless they are
couched in very humble form and accompanied by offers to agree to bishops residing in
that kingdom, but that he will go forward with his plans, and obtain by arms what they
refuse to concede to reason…”110  By March no real progress had been made.  The king
still refused to speak with the commissioners unless they came as suppliants and restored
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the bishops to Scotland immediately.111  They commissioners remained steadfast against
Charles I’s demands and refused to disarm as they were faced with imminent danger.112
The new French agent in England, Monsieur de Montereul reported similar findings
concerning the difficulty the Scottish commissioners were encountering with their king.
He also noted that the Scots were becoming more resolved than ever in their struggle
against Charles I.113  As a result of fruitless attempts at negotiation, the First Bishops’
War commenced.  As Robert Baillie so eloquently but simply stated, the king entered in
“…a course of warr against us.”114  These accumulations - the prayer book forced upon
the Scots, the refusal of Covenanter commissioners, open military action, and Charles’
overall disregard for his Scottish subjects and their needs - led to ideas of foreign
intervention.
Due to the long-standing Auld Alliance the French were a clear source of possible
aid and intervention.  However the French were still embroiled in the Thirty Years War.
They had only just declared war on Philip IV of Spain in 1635 followed in 1636 by
hostilities with the Holy Roman Emperor.  Louis XIII was staunchly anti-Spanish and
was thus trying to keep Charles I from forming any type of alliance with Spain.  Due to
the precarious relationship between France and England, the Scots had to be extremely
careful when appealing to France for aid.  No appeal could be too overt as to alienate the
French from the English.  In reality the Scots were walking a narrow tightrope,
attempting to balance their needs with the needs of the French.
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The 1639 letter was actually the second attempt to secure French intervention.
During the First Bishops’ War in early 1639, the Covenanters drafted their first letter to
Louis XIII.  However this letter was markedly different from the letter they eventually
sent.  The initial letter did not ask for aid, but instead asked Louis XIII to mediate
between the Covenanters and Charles.  Robert Baillie commented on the letter in his
journal stating, “We were hopefull of powerfull assistance from abroad if we should have
required it.  France would not have failed to have embraced our protection.”115  In any
case, the idea soon fell by the wayside for the Covenanters feared a backlash from the
English, as they did not want to ignite anti-Scottish feelings in England.116  However, in
early 1640, the Covenanters changed their mind and sent the second letter drafted in 1639
to Louis XIII.  Something had definitively changed.  In February 1640, Charles I sent
troops and ammunition to Scotland to strengthen Edinburgh Castle.  This alarming event
made the Covenanters realize that the Treaty of Berwick, which had ended the First
Bishops’ War, had simply been a ploy by Charles to gain more time to prepare for
another strike upon them.  Also, the positive reaction toward the Covenanting movement
from the former French ambassador, Bellièvre, encouraged the Scots to definitively reach
out to France.  Thus in 1640 the Covenanters sent a letter to France appealing for aid
from Louis XIII.
The letter carrier was one William Colville, a Church of Scotland minister.117
Colville made it successfully to France but through convoluted channels one copy of the
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letter fell into Charles’ hands by way of his lord high treasurer and main ally in Scotland,
Lord Traquair.118  Contrary to the very first letter written in 1639, this letter was a direct
call for aid.  It appealed directly to the benevolence and kindness of Louis XIII as the
“…refuge and sanctuary of afflicted Princes, and States…”119    The letter’s
superscription was also “Au Roy,” a gesture of kindness and reverence to Louis XIII.
For the Scots, the letter was one of the remaining options to win back the right to practice
Presbyterianism against an absent king trying to impose English religion and culture upon
them.  The letter also represented the rekindling of the Auld Alliance between Scotland
and France.  In fact, it is the one scant piece of evidence that exists of friendship between
Scotland and France in a time period when the alliance was wounded from the divide of
Presbyterianism and Catholicism.
The interception of the letter led to the immediate end of possible French aid for
the Covenanters.  As soon as it was intercepted the English began their investigation into
the letter.  On 11 April 1640 Charles wrote to the English ambassador in Paris, the earl of
Leicester, commanding him to hold an audience with Louis XIII.  Just like the French,
Charles worried about rupturing the current relationship between England and France.
Accordingly, he commanded Leicester to tell Louis “…the reality and freeness of our
heart, and how unwilling we are to suffer any sinister conceit to remain with us, to the
prejudice of our friendship, or to the raising of the least misunderstanding between
us…”120  Charles also instructed Leicester to show Louis the intercepted letter.  Clearly
Charles viewed the letter as a direct threat to the vulnerable peace between England and
                                                 
118 Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 181.
119 Rushworth, Historical Collections, 1120.
120 CSPD 1640, 19, Charles I to Robert earl of Leicester, English ambassador in Paris, 11
April 1640.
40
France.  However he also saw the document as treason, as the letter treated Louis XIII as
the Scots’ sovereign.  For Charles this proved the extent of the disloyalty that was
rampant among the Scots but it also confirmed his long-lingering fear; that the French,
who in his mind wanted to detach Scotland from his kingdom for their own purposes,
encouraged the rebellion in Scotland.121  Although Charles wanted to preserve the
friendship between the English and the French for the time being, the deep-seated
precedent of Anglo-Franco hostility and antagonism was still rampant in his line of
thinking.
 The interception of the letter was also a contributing factor in Charles’ decision to
call a parliament.  Charles was in desperate need of money to finance his upcoming war
with the Scots.  He ruled without a parliament for eleven years, but he felt that a new
parliament would be willing to grant the money needed to fight what he believed to be a
traitorous rebellion against him.  Charles believed he possessed the trump card; the
captured letter to Louis XIII from the Covenanters.   The letter only proved to further his
convictions that the French were behind the Scottish rebellion and he was convinced that
parliament would interpret the letter in the same way.  However Charles once again
misinterpreted the feelings of his people.  The English did not want to fight the Scots, nor
did the parliament called in April 1640 want to grant money for another war against
them.
Before parliament met Charles arrested Loudoun who was in London with other
Scottish commissioners.  Loudoun was questioned extensively on 14 April, and he denied
knowing the letter had been sent.  He also denied knowing the French language, as well
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as Colville, the letter carrier.  When presented with the letter, Loudoun acknowledged
that he did indeed sign it, however he stated that it was dictated to him, again stressing
his incompetence in French.122  That same day, Charles presented parliament with the
letter.  The Lord Keeper explained the significance of the subscription “Au Roy,” and
then the letter was read in French, immediately followed by the English translation.  After
its completion, the king rose and announced, “Of these Gentlemen, that have set their
hands to this Letter, here is one, and I believe you would think it very strange, if I should
not lay him fast; and therefore I have Signed a Warrant, to lay him close Prisoner in the
Tower.”123* The Venetian Ambassador also reported that Charles “…did not wish them
[parliament] to deal with any affairs at present, as the question of getting the army into
the field was too urgent.”124  Charles was extremely confidant parliament would see that
the signatories of the letter had committed treason, especially with what he considered to
be the truly damning superscription “Au Roy.”
On 15 April, Montereul reported the events surrounding the letter to the French
Secretary of State, the comte de Chavigny.  He stated;
…qu’ils voient comme ses sujets d’Ecosse imploroient le secours d’un autre
prince contre leur prince naturel, et encore du Roy son frere, qu’il croiort bien ne
les devoir jamais assister et n’avoir eu aucune part en leurs mauvais desseins.  Il
fit veoir après la suscritpion de la lettre, qui fut trouvée fort unjurieuse au Roy de
la Grande Bretagne...125
Thus, at least within correspondence, the French were trying to severe any ties they may
have had to the letter.  As Montereul stated, Louis would not take part in assisting the
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Scots, nor would the French play any role in the Scots’ bad intentions.  He also noted the
letter’s injurious superscription to Chavigny.  Montereul reported that the reading of the
letter in Parliament brought with it two advantages; the justification of the arrest of the
Scottish deputies and a reason for the procurement of funds.126
However, despite what Montereul reported and what Charles hoped for, the king
found that he had once again miscalculated. Instead of a positive response from
parliament, he received the opposite reaction.  Parliament briefly stated that the letter had
been written before the Treaty of Berwick, which ended the First Bishops’ War.  It was
also their impression that the letter had not been sent to Louis XIII, which indeed it had
been.  The Commons thus skirted around the issue of the letter and instead responded to
the king by asking him about ship money and tunnage and poundage, all unpopular issues
facing England.  These issues had yet to be addressed and the Commons were astonished
that through all the drawn out talk of the letter “…not one word…” had been given to
these pressing matters.127  Even Montereul noted in his letter dated 23 April to Chavigny
how important the matter of ship money was to parliament.128  In addition to the
aforementioned grievances, parliament enumerated their numerous other grievances to
Charles including “1. Liberty of Parliament.  2. Generals concerning religion.  3.
Generals concerning civil government.”129  Clearly parliament was concerned with more
pressing matters than an old letter supposedly sent by the Scots to Louis XIII.  Needless
to say, Charles was not pleased, and dissolved parliament after three short weeks.
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Chapter 3
The Rebellion Progresses
Around the same time the letter was intercepted William Colville’s brother,
James, was arrested.  James Colville was in England distributing papers promoting the
Scottish cause when he was apprehended and incarcerated in the Tower of London for
dispensing seditious pamphlets.130  It was originally believed that James was carrying the
letter to France when in fact William was the brother who had delivered the letter to
Louis XIII.  In May through secret correspondence, the earl of Leicester noted that
William Colville was in France and had been since early March.  He also mentioned that
William inquired after his brother James who he quickly learned was imprisoned in the
Tower.131  The English still believed that James was the real letter carrier, as is indicated
in more correspondence from the earl of Leicester on 8 May.  Even so, suspicions were
growing around one William Colville.
William Colville quickly became a wanted man, as the English slowly discovered
his involvement with the letter sent to Louis XIII.  On 9 May 1640 the earl of Leicester
wrote to England stating that there was a Colville residing in France but his name was
William, not James.  The ambassador wrote that Colville left Scotland on 10 March and
was in France carrying letters from Colonel Erskine, a colonel levying troops in Scotland
for France and brother to the earl of Mar.  He also reported that Colville commanded
Scottish troops as a Captain Lieutenant.132  In reality, Colville acted as a mediator
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between the Covenanters and Thomas Chambers, Cardinal Richelieu’s almoner.133
However, Leicester stated that he would “…inquire after him; some but very few of his
countrymen I know, the Scots have never come much to me, they take me, I think to be
Ambr of the King of England only and Chambers the Cardinals’ chaplain is Ambr for
Scotland in their opinion, for to him they addresse themselves much…”134  Although
Leicester began the search for Colville within France, he lacked the support of Scots in
France for they saw him as an ambassador for England, thus not representing their needs.
Yet with the growing suspicions surrounding William Colville, Leicester spoke of
kidnapping him and sending him back to England,
…I think I could finde him out…though I could get him into my handes I should
not know how to convey him away, nor send him over, unlesse these ministers
were acquainted with it…so as without all question somewhere or other, notice
would be taken of him, and he would be stayed unlesse the action were avowed
by this State, for it is not to be done here [in France]…And to desire the authority
of this State to arrest the said Colvill and to conduct him into England, is a thing
that I doubt would hardly be granted here, unlesse the person were a notorious
traytor, of which  I have not proofes to allege against him…135
Leicester’s worry about William Colville would not be left unattended, as he would soon
have to deal with the French government.
With the revelation of the letter in parliament, Scotland and France were both
forced to respond.  The Scots quickly published a pamphlet that explained their reasons
for the letter.  They stated that they wrote to France in part due to past precedent of aid.
The pamphlet also asserted that there were multiple letters written, however one “…was
but an Embrio forsaken in the birth…” while the other letter “…was formed consonant to
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the Instructions, and signed by many hands; But neither was this sent from us…because
we conceived that mediation from France would be but late to avert the danger which
was so neere.”136  In addition, the writing contested Charles’ complaint about the letter’s
superscription, “Aide and assistance hath been given in farmer times, If we had called at
that time, or have called now in return of our troubles upon Denmark, Holland, Sweden,
Poland, or other Nations for help, are we therefore inviting them all to sovereignitie over
us?”137  Charles’ assertion about the treasonous nature of the superscription was
essentially made a mockery because the Scots’ pointed to the silliness of his claim, as it
would make many nations sovereign over each other.
The pamphlet also stated that the two letters written in 1639 were done so before
the Treaty of Berwick.  With regard to the highly controversial superscription, “…the
Letter was neither sealed, folded, nor written on the back by us, or by our
knowledge…”138  Thus in an attempt to clear themselves the Covenanters spread the
notion that they had nothing to do with the controversial “Au Roy,” or that they had even
sent the letters.  All of this was clearly self-preserving propaganda that would coincide
with similar French propaganda.  However the denial distanced the Scots from France,
making aid in the near future impossible.
France was equally quick to respond to the letter read in parliament.  Louis XIII
quickly rebuffed any attachment to the letter and to Scotland in an audience with the earl
of Leicester.  The ambassador reported that when he told Louis about the letter and its
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superscription Louis declared, “…A moi?…as if he had started a little, ie n’ay point eu
de lettre; no, sir, said I, the letter was intercepted…”139  Leicester then showed Louis a
copy of the letter, which in reality he had seen before.  Louis’ response was in direct
agreement with the French position of denying any and all culpability
…Je vous asseure que ie n’ay rien sçeu de cela, et s’ils sont si mal advises (those
were his wordes) que de m’escrire…vous pourrer asseurer le Roy mon frere, que
ie n’ay jamais eu et ne veux jamais ausir àffaire avec eux…Ouy (said he) le Roy
mon frere peut estre asseure de cela, que ie n’aime les rebelles et seditieux et que
ie ne les assisteray jamais contre leur Prince.140
The French King thus denied seeing the letter and helping the Scots. However his
statement was in fact only partly truthful, as the letter he had seen was a different copy.141
Louis also claimed to hate the rebellion and the Scots’ seditious behavior against their
natural prince. Leicester’s audience ended with assurances made by Louis to Charles I;
Your Majesty (said I) will then be pleased that I advertise the King my master of
your promise and assurance that you will not countenance nor favuor the Scots:
Ouy said he, ie vous prie escriver le au Roy mon frere, car comme ie vous ai dit,
ie n’assisteray point les Escossois contre luy, ny aucuns autres rebelles contre leur
Prince.  Me thought this King spake this with much affection to the King and
shewed great dislike of the Scots proceedings, and particularly of their letter,
which makes me confident that in his owne disposition he doth abhorre their
actions…142
Thus Louis again asserted his dislike of the Scots and his assurance to Charles that he
would never aid the Scottish rebellion.  Clearly Louis attempted to distance himself from
the Scots to avoid rupture with England.  From Leicester’s response it is also evident that
he believed Louis’ sentiments.  However in hindsight it is apparent the Louis was simply
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trying to maintain a friendly relationship with England when in fact France had been in
negotiations with Scotland.
Cardinal Richelieu was also elated that the French averted entanglement with the
Scots.  Yet he recognized the precarious situation the French faced if it was discovered
that they possessed a copy of the letter or that they were in contact with William Colville.
On 24 April he wrote to Chavigny;
Par l’événement Mr de Bellièvre cognoistra que nous avons esté plus sages que
luy.  On sçait en Angleterre que le gentilhomme qui l’est venu trouver est icy,
c’est à luy à prendre garde qu’on ne le prenne au retour, et, à Mr de Chavigny, à
luy faire une response sy précautionée que, si elle vient à estre descouverte, elle
ne puisse estre mal interprétée.  Monsieur de Chavigny avisera, avec le d. sr de
Bellièvre, s’il faudra retenir la d. lettre, ou la renvoyer, et donner bonnes paroles,
telles toutesfois qu’elles ne puissent estre mal expliquées du roy d’Angleterre, si
elles viennent à estre descouvertes.143
Richelieu obviously believed it was not wise to take Bellièvre’s advice in aiding the
Scots.  He also stated that Colville must take great care to avoid being captured.  In
conjunction with this sentiment, Richelieu advised Chavigny to take great precaution
when writing Colville, only using language that could not be misinterpreted.  The next
day Richelieu wrote again to Chavigny.  This letter also possessed a highly cautionary
tone.  Richelieu stated that “…le d. espion nous faisant cognoistre qu’ils n’ont pas envie
de se brouiller avec aucune des couronnes.”144  This reassured the French, at least for the
time being, that the English were not planning on initiating any kind of hostile action
toward France.
Although the French denied knowing about the letter they did their best to protect
William Colville without accumulating too much suspicion.  Leicester was still actively
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looking for Colville, but every French official he spoke with denied knowing anyone by
that name.  For example, on 1 June French minister Monsieur de Bullion stated that he
knew of no one in the king’s service named Colville.  However Leicester put his request
in writing; “On demande pouvoir l’authoitié de prendre Guillaume Colvill Escossois et de
l’envoyer en Angleterre…”145  Bullion informed Leicester he would look into the matter.
However the French had no intention of accommodating Leicester.
Richelieu wrote to Chavigny in response to Leicester’s demand to take William
Colville back to England.  The Cardinal explicitly stated “Faut respondre qu’on n’a
aucune cognoissance que Colvill soit criminel au respect du roy d’Angleterre, son
souverain.  Que s’il n’est accusé d’autre chose que d’avoir négocié avec les ministres de
France S.M. le sçait innocent parce qu’il ne l’a pas faict.”146  Colville was accused of
negotiating with French ministers, which according to the proceedings between the
French and English, Charles knew Colville was innocent.  Richelieu openly defended
Colville and attempted to keep him out of Leicester’s hands.  The French claimed there
was no evidence to indicate Colville committed a crime and thus he could not be forced
back to England.   The response that Richelieu gave to Chavigny was the exact response
Leicester received.  Thus Leicester’s attempt to capture Colville and forcefully send him
back to England was thwarted.
  The French had in fact avoided disaster with the recalling of Bellièvre who
wanted so deeply to assist the Covenanters.  Louis also proved cunning when dealing
with the English.  The propaganda released with the denial of seeing a letter written by
the Covenanters corroborated the Scottish contention that none of their letters had ever
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been sent to Louis XIII.  Their immediate reaction contributed to the maintenance of
relatively good terms with the English, something they desired.  Thus Scotland and
France were cleared of all wrongdoing concerning the letter, although Charles still
maintained great misgivings about both countries.
The letter sent by the Covenanters to Louis XIII also created waves throughout
Europe.  Hugo Grotius, the Swedish ambassador to France, reported rather extensively on
the letter.  On 7 May 1640 he wrote about what had occurred in England and Scotland.
He specifically extrapolated on the main point of contention of the letter, the
superscription ‘Au Roy,’ stating that it caused great offense to Charles I.147  Thus,
continental Europe maintained a watchful eye on the ongoing events in Scotland.
Although the letter matter appeared to end amicably, there were still many
fissures within Scotland, England, and France.  The French were still gravely troubled by
England’s burgeoning relationship with Spain.  This is evident from Leicester’s repeated
attempts to quash French fears “…as they [the French] shall not have cause to feare
Spaine…”148  The relationship between France and England was far from stable.  Nor did
things end well for Colville.  By the end of May, William was found on a ship coming
from Holland, and at first denied being of any relation to James Colville, still imprisoned
in the Tower of London as the suspected letter carrier.149  In June William Colville was
finally pinpointed as the Colville mentioned in the letter to France, and was thus taken to
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London under guard.150   Colville would later be released, and eventually became
principal of Edinburgh University.
Meanwhile Charles continued to fortify Edinburgh Castle.  His war preparations
quickly progressed yet he still feared that leading Englishmen were in contact with the
Scots.151  Charles however faced an even bigger problem; the English people had no
desire to go to war against the Scots for a second time.  In June the Venetian ambassador
in England noted, “It seems that they discover more and more, by experience, the
reluctance of the people here to take up arms against them [Scotland].152  The English
now viewed the Scots as being on their side, as the Scots were enemies Archbishop Laud
just like the them.  Vehemence toward the Papacy proved to be even more unifying for
the Scottish and English.153  Charles did not or could not understand this bond between
his subjects and this was to become a fatal flaw.
The Scots too prepared for the imminent war against Charles.  Their preparations
also proved to be more successful and organized than Charles’.  Indeed, many foreign
officers remained in Scotland training soldiers in the spring.154  Yet something else was
brewing in Scotland; talk of deposition.  The idea of deposing Charles began in 1638
when Wariston broached the subject, and now the idea gained more momentum.  Talk of
deposition was never widespread but it was beginning to circulate as the Scots found
themselves fighting Charles for the third straight year.  The thought was “…that if he
would never concede their demands and honour his concessions…then they would have
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to either have to give up their demands and submit, or deny his authority and depose
him.”155  This rapidly become an option as Charles repeatedly rebuffed the Scots’
commissioners and was clearly voiding the Treaty of Berwick with the fortification of
Edinburgh Castle.
Charles faced a formidable foe as Scots’ were determined to receive recognition
of their religion whatever the cost.  To achieve this, the Scots wanted to hold another
session of the Scottish parliament, and either Charles would consent or they would hold it
against his wishes.  Charles was aware of this condition and decided to let a session of
parliament sit in July 1640.  The Scottish parliament removed bishops and officers of
state from parliamentary membership, which greatly deteriorated Charles’ power base in
parliament.156  With regard to religion, parliament ratified the acts passed at the Glasgow
Assembly and the National Covenant.  Previous acts of parliament in favor of bishops
were nullified, including the Five Articles of Perth.157  The Scottish parliament also
extended its sitting until November.  This would provide a precedent for the English
Long Parliament, which would move England closer to civil war.
Meanwhile Charles ended the Short Parliament in May.  The parliament failed to
furnish him with funds to fight the Scots so he was forced to look elsewhere.  It was this
need for funds that drove Charles further into the arms of the Spanish.  The king looked
to be creating an alliance with “…the most iniquitous of all the papist ‘tyrants.’  To fund
his war against Scotland…”158  Yet once again he failed to see the international
implications that this would create.  He “…saw no hypocrisy in condemning the Scots for
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asking Louis XIII to intervene in making peace while he looked to Spain, Holland,
Denmark, and elsewhere to make war against his own subjects.”159   Similarly, Charles
reached out to France in hopes of attaining a loan.  However he was completely rebuffed,
as Richelieu wanted nothing to do with Charles’ difficulties.160  This was a clear attempt
to play on existing tensions between Spain and France.
In addition to Charles’ lack of funds, he also faced another problem concerning
France; the French refused to send an ambassador to England.  The Venetian ambassador
in France tried to convince Louis to send an ambassador to England so the relationship
between France and England could be maintained.  However Louis countered this
assertion stating he had not thought extensively on the matter and that the “…King of
Great Britain, a prince of peculiar ideas, is unwilling to extend his vision outside his own
kingdom, it pleasing him better to toil there with disadvantage and loss of reputation, than
to take advantage of what could be done outside, for the benefit of the common cause.”161
Louis was referring to the matter in the Palatine, which still plagued both England and
Scotland.  It is evident from Louis’ comment that the Franco-Anglo relationship was
rapidly deteriorating.  It is also apparent that Charles’ reputation abroad was unfavorable,
something that was highly undesirable especially when relationships between kings were
so vital to the inner workings of a country.
Charles’ turn toward Spain also signaled the reemergence of vehement anti-
Catholicism.  A degree of anti-Catholicism existed in England since the country became a
protestant nation, yet it had been growing in great lengths since Charles married Henrietta
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Maria.  People disliked the dominance of the queen’s faction, but more explicitly they
feared the Catholics within her entourage.162  People had long feared the entanglement in
one of the many wars between the Habsburgs and Bourbons.  Charles’ actions during his
rule did nothing to dispel these worries, as he had ended the formal alliance with France,
went against his peoples’ wish to go to war with Catholic Spain, and allowed the
reemergence of a Spanish faction at court.163  Scottish propaganda that began in 1638
claimed papists, in order to remove Protestantism and reestablish Catholicism, advanced
the war with England.164  At the time this was a real worry and fear for people, and
Charles’ move toward Spain did nothing to quash these feelings.  A speech in parliament
by a Mr. Ruydiard echoed this sentiment, “This Roman Ambition will at length bring in
the Roman Riligion…”165
The questioning of Charles’ authority went hand in hand with the reemergence of
hostile anti-Catholicism.  Charles effectively removed himself from the national
conscience that was so vital in ruling Scotland, as well as England, and his assertion of
the Divine Right of Kings was simply a joke.166  In accordance with the degradation of
Charles’ power, the Scots wrote a note to him in March 1640 declaring their desires,
including the justification of their covenant according to the laws of Scotland.167  The
paper also included many ecclesiastical and policy demands.  These direct and
straightforward demands challenged Charles’ authority in his own kingdom.  Soon
thereafter Charles stripped the earl of Argyll of his titles of Argyll and Tarbet, thus
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ordering that no one should obey Argyll.  However the response from Edinburgh was not
what Charles anticipated.  Instead of complying with his order, the Scottish council
replied with resounding non-compliance, “…in sic trublous tymes…thay durst scarslie
hasard to mak any sic proclamationis against the persone of sic ane pryme noble man;
besides, it wes not agrieable to Scottis lawis, to deprive him of his estait or
digneteis…”168  This was a direct rejection of royal order and thus a clear subversion of
power.  The Scottish council claimed they could not proclaim the order as Scotland was
in an uproar; they faced sea and land armies, and Edinburgh Castle was threatened.169
All this time Lord Loudoun continued to plead his innocence.  By July Loudoun
was released from the Tower with the stipulation that he would act as a pseudo-negotiator
between the King and the Covenanters, presenting them with the Articles of Pacification
and then returning to England in three weeks to report on his progress.170  Loudoun did
return to England at the end of July but with the Scottish army, and was present at the
Scottish victory at the Battle of Newburn on 28 July.171
The Scots knew the support of the English people was vital to their chances of
success.  In accordance with this position, they sent manifestos and propaganda to
England explaining their position.  These manifestos included the changes Charles made
against their religion, his attempt to suppress the ancient liberty of Scotland, which
included the interruption of Scottish trade, the confiscation of their ships and goods.172
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This declaration was an attempt to win English support for the Covenanter cause as well
as to prepare the English for a Scottish invasion.  Similarly, the propaganda sent into
England intended to
…highlight the fundamental unity of the Scottish and English causes; to identify
the mutual enemies of the two kingdoms, that is, the bishops and popish
councilors who had led the king astray; and to emphasize the lawful and orderly
nature of the Scots proceedings, so as to allay English fears that the Scots were
seditious rebels or (after the August invasion) self-interested marauders.173
The Scots believed the only way to truly defeat Charles I and make him respect their
views was to invade England.   The Scots also issued “The Intentiouns of the army of the
kingdome of Scotland, declairit to there bretheren of England, by the commissioners of
the lait parliament, and by the Generall, nobilmen, barrons, and uther officiaris of the
army.”  This document professed Scotland to be a second Israel, a shelter for God’s
people free from religious tyranny.  They sought vindication of their religion from the
evils of Charles I.174
In accordance with their religious sentiment, the Scots wrote to ministers of
reformed churches in Switzerland seeking aid for their religious precepts against Charles
I.  On 4 June 1640 Charles Marini, a resident in Zurich, informed Grotius of the contents
of the Scottish letter to the Swiss;
…il semble, qu’ils ont assez de suject de deféndre leur privilèges et prévenir le
mal qui les menace….En un mot ils concluent que les évesques introduits en
Escosse auroyent tâche d’introduire peu à peu non seulement les cérémonies et
l’hiérarchie papales, bastir des autels, insinuer l’union avec la papauté, mais
s’attacher aussy au gouvernement d’estat, ius utriusque gladii sibi arrogando et, ut
verba sonant litterarum, in sanctioris consilii senatu dominabantur, ius in foro
dicebant, vectigalibus et fisco regio praesidebant, ut tandem et ad cancellariatus
vestigia pervenirent.  Telles choses certes on ne devroit point permettre aux gens
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d’église protestante moins les défendre en la possession d’icelles come mal
convenables à leur estat et personnes.175
Thus, the Scots sought confirmation and aid from other like-minded Protestants against
the injustices of Charles I.  On 27 August it was reported that the Swiss wrote to Charles
seeking an amicable compromise on behalf of the Scots.176  Hence Grotius’
correspondence illuminates the fact that the Scots actively sought support beyond the
French for their struggle against Charles I.  This support came mainly from Scandinavia,
and surprisingly Christian IV gave more aid to the Covenanters than to Charles I.177  In
fact, by 1639 Scotland already had diplomatic ties to Scandinavia, which “…staved off
condemnation of the National Covenant or military intervention by Denmark-Norway.”178
In addition, the letter to the Swiss depicts the Scots’ continued effort to gain support from
continental Europe even when aid from France was no longer a possibility.  This appeal
to the Swiss also represented the truly international dimension and European-wide
consequences of the Scottish rebellion against Charles I.
Some of the English did fear an invasion while others simply believed it to be a
bluff.  However, it was not a bluff, and in August the Scots crossed the Tweed River into
England.  The Scots maintained a conscious effort to keep on good terms with the
English, as they were potential allies.  Thus the Scots developed a strict no plundering
policy.  Upon the crossing of the Tweed, “They issued a proclamation assuring the men
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of Northumberland that they would not take a chicken or a pot of ale without paying for
it.  They brought with them cattle and sheep for their immediate necessities.”179
While the Scots hoped to end the war quickly by securing their demands, the
French wanted to keep England embroiled in the Scottish war.  This went hand in hand
with the French refusal to send an ambassador to England.  The English wanted a French
ambassador in London to put pressure on the Spanish to negotiate, and the French refusal
eradicated this pressure.  The continuation of the war possessed a similar premise;
…the Puritans are less hostile to us [France] than to the Spaniards.  These rebels
in Scotland are making war openly on the king, and in England they are all ready
to make some disturbance.  So long as they see the negotiations continued with
the Spanish ambassadors, and that there is no one representing France, they will
keep up their agitation, from their fear that something may be arranged with the
Spaniards to the prejudice of us or of the common business…180
Thus it was to France’s benefit to keep England at war to further their seemingly
perpetual conflict with Spain.  In addition to the need to keep England at war, the French
had to deal with their involvement in the Thirty Years War.  This pressing matter, much
closer to home, distracted French attention from the Scottish war.
The Scots however made great strides in England.  Soon after they crossed the
Tweed they occupied Newcastle followed by Durham.  These occupations led to great
English concern of what was to happen next, which led to the continued deterioration of
the king’s authority and position.  There seemed to be no likelihood that Charles could
raise enough troops to defeat the Scots, as the English and Charles’ international
overtures proved to be uncooperative in supplying men and money.181
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While Charles found no real support abroad to fight the Scots, there were
countries that disagreed with their rebellion against their natural sovereign.  For example,
the English ambassador in the German states, Mr. Curtius, wrote that the German princes
and people hated the crimes committed by the Scots.182  He also asserted that Charles was
following the proper course, as he was merely attempting to uphold the law.
Yet with no viable support Charles was forced to negotiate with the Covenanters.
Even his own army “…was without heart or discipline.”183 In October the council of
peers met at York to provide Charles with advice on how to provide safety for England.184
At this council Charles declared that he would summon another parliament, which would
become the Long Parliament.   In addition, Charles suggested that negotiations with the
Scots be held at York, thus hoping to exert his influence on the Scots to fulfill his own
ends.185  However the Scots refused Charles’ proposal.  They repeatedly attempted
negotiation in person with Charles in London only to be rebuffed.186  Thus they were ill
inclined to repeat previous mistakes.  Even while negotiating at Ripon, the Scots
displayed their suspicion of Charles as they refused to accept safe conduct for their
commissioners signed by the king alone, instead insisting that the English peers also sign
the conduct.187  The Scots made a conscious effort not to repeat the mistakes they made in
the past when dealing with Charles.  Their efforts paid off as they concluded the Treaty
of Ripon in late October.  The terms of the Treaty were mortifying for Charles.  The
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largest concession Charles made was agreeing to pay the Scots a huge daily subsidy.
This made Charles dependent on parliament to provide funds to pay the Scots, thus
disallowing him to dissolve parliament.188  The truly bizarre development that occurred
during the conclusion of the Treaty of Ripon was that Charles made no real attempt at
negotiation, instead allowing the English and Scottish commissioners to negotiate
directly.189  This was a direct shift from the negotiation of the Treaty of Berwick.  Perhaps
this development signaled Charles’ dwindling confidence in his own ability, or his hope
that the English commissioners could attain more concessions from the Scots without
him.190  Whatever the reason for Charles’ lack of participation, the Treaty of Ripon
proved to be successful for the Scots.  For the English it also proved successful as the
Treaty ensured that a parliament would be called.
The Scots finally triumphed over the English with the conclusion of the Treaty of
Ripon.  A struggle ignited by a prayer book now seemed to be at its end.  The letter sent
to France by the Covenanters also seemed to fade out of thought.  Yet those involved
with the letter did not simply fade away.  Loudoun’s clear articulation and leadership of
the covenanting movement later led to his appointment as Lord Chancellor of Scotland.
After the conclusion of the Second Bishops’ War, Alexander Leslie swore to never fight
Charles I again for he felt the Protestant religion was secure, and in 1641 he was made
the earl of Leven and he resigned his generalship.191  However with the coming of the
Irish rebellion and later the English Civil War, Leslie was again called to serve.  He was
made lord general during the English Civil War, thus negating his previous promise to
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never raise arms against the King.  Hugh Montgomery was accused of being disloyal to
the Covenanters, yet these accusations went largely unsubstantiated, and later in life he
became a member of the Scottish Privy Council.192
The earl of Rothes fell into a precarious financial situation, and died in August
1641 from a fever.  The earl of Mar also experienced a financial downturn, and he died in
1653.  Like his path to the covenanting movement, the marquis of Montrose took a much
different route after the letter was sent then his fellow signatories.  He hoped to walk
among the upper echelon of the Covenanting movement, yet he instead felt neglected and
slighted by them.  It was this neglect that drove Montrose back into the arms of Charles I.
The two kept up a secret correspondence, and when a Scottish parliament was called
without the approval of the king, Montrose came to the conclusion the Covenant had
become “radical.”193  His move toward Charles I was also fostered by his hate of the earl
of Argyll, the leader of the Covenant.  In an effort to remove Argyll, Montrose informed
the king that there was talk of deposition in Scotland, however his plan failed, as he was
later imprisoned in Edinburgh Castle.194  After being released from the castle, Montrose
turned to rallying support for Charles I in Scotland, and when this effort failed, Montrose
went to England.195
Above all, the letter had impacted Charles I.  He chose to take a stand against the
possibility of French aid above all other possible sources of aid coming into Scotland,
including Scandinavia.  The letter, about which he had seemed so confident, failed to
bring about funding from parliament to finance the Second Bishops’ War.  Instead
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Charles fought another war vastly unprepared, and was consequently forced into the
humiliating Treaty of Ripon.  The treaty also ensured that a parliament would be held.
The years that followed were especially trying for Charles, as his power and authority
were tested on every level.  He traveled to Scotland in an attempt to seek out support
against the Long Parliament but was rebuffed.  Riots broke out in London, and eventually
the English Civil War broke out.  The Scottish Revolution served as an excellent model
for its English counterpart, setting a precedent of challenging Charles I.  After years of
fighting, Charles fled to the Scots hoping to avoid capture by his English enemies.  The
king was instead held for ransom and eventually sold back to his English enemies.  On 30
January 1649 after more than ten years since the prayer book inflicted on Scotland began
the road to revolution, Charles was beheaded and the office of king was abolished.
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Conclusion
As a small country with vastly fewer resources and manpower than England,
Scotland’s defeat of Charles I in the First and Second Bishops’ Wars was a triumph,
securing their religious and political liberties.  However limited resources forced the
Scots, if they were to have any real hope of success, to appeal to other countries for aid.
Appeals were thus made to Scandinavian countries, France, and Switzerland.  While
Scotland received substantial material assistance from the United Provinces and from
Sweden, it was the appeal for assistance to France that brought about confrontation and
conflict with Charles I.
The letter written by the Covenanters to Louis XIII of France confirmed to
Charles, at least in his own mind, that France was ultimately behind the Scottish
Revolution.  Although Charles was mistaken, the letter signified that the “Auld Alliance”
between France and the Scotland remained active, as can also be seen through Franco-
Scottish correspondence.  It is therefore strange that this connection between the two
countries during the Scottish Revolution has been overlooked when considering the
Revolution’s international context.  While Scotland did not in the end receive aid from
France, the French dimension of the Scottish Revolution is still of great importance.
When considering which countries to ask for assistance, the Auld Alliance made
France the obvious choice for Scotland.  Although Cardinal Richelieu’s correspondence
reveals that he was wary of entangling the French in the Scottish Revolution, it seems
probable that the French would have given covert aid to Scotland had the letter not been
intercepted and published, as is evident from Thomas Chambers visits to France and the
talks between Bellièvre and the Covenanters.
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Moreover the interception of the letter prompted Charles to take a stand against
the possibility of French aid rather than act to halt the actual aid flowing into Scotland
from Scandinavia.   Clearly this indicates the extent of Charles’ fears concerning France
compared with Scandinavian countries: the mere possibility of French assistance
frightened Charles I to act.  He could not tolerate even the possibility of French aid
without taking vigorous counter-measures.
Charles’ attempt to take a stand against the Scots after the interception of the
letter ended disastrously for him in the Short Parliament.  Although the interception of
the letter ended all possibility of French aid to Scotland, the Scots still brought Charles to
his knees.  Despite their inferior resources, they defeated the king’s army in battle,
invaded and occupied northern England, and forced the king to pay them a huge daily
subsidy until he reconvened the English Parliament and received its backing for a peace
that granted all of Scotland’s religious and political demands.  Even more importantly,
the Scottish Revolution set a precedent for rebellion against Charles, acting as a model
for the Irish Rebellion and later the English Civil War.
In the end, the Scots’ demands divided the English political elite and precipitated
a Civil War, in which the king’s opponents once more invaded and again defeated the
king’s army in battle; and when his English enemies seemed likely to capture him, the
king fled to the Scots.  After holding Charles ransom, the Scots sold him back to his
English enemies, who eventually tried and executed him and abolished the office of king.
In the downfall of the Stuart Monarchy, the short letter the Scottish leaders sent to Louis
XIII of France played a brief, neglected but important role.
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